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Abstract
Recently, Tegmark pointed out that the superposition of ion states in-
volved in the superposition of firing and resting states of a neuron quickly
decohere. It undoubtedly indicates that neural networks cannot work as
quantum computers, or computers taking advantage of coherent states.
Does it also mean that the brain can be modeled as a neural network
obeying classical physics? Here we show that it does not mean that the
brain can be modeled as a neural network obeying classical physics. A
brand new perspective in research of neural networks from quantum the-
oretical aspect is presented.
1 INTRODUCTION
Although, in most current mainstream biophysics research, the brain is modeled
as a neural network obeying classical physics, some researchers have argued that
quantum mechanics may play an essential role. On the other hand, recently,
Tegmark [1] pointed out that the superposition of ion states involved in the
superposition of firing state and resting state of a neuron quickly decohere. Then
he concluded that (a) there is no need to worry about the fact that current neural
network simulations do not incorporate effects of quantum coherence, and (b)
the only remnant from quantum mechanics is the apparent randomness that we
subjectively perceive every time the subject system evolves into a superposition,
but this can be simply modeled by including a random number generator in the
simulation. The motivation of this paper is to investigate the validity of the
conclusion (b).
Over the past few decades, neural networks have provided the dominant
framework for understanding how the brain implements the computations nec-
essary for its survival. At the heart of these networks are simplified and static
models of nerve cells. However, recently, more and more researchers have been
noticing that today’s neural network models do not reflect real neurons correctly
[2, 3].
On the other hand, some researchers have argued that quantum theory may
play an essential role in the brain dynamics.
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Concerning quantum theory, the past few decades have seen a growing con-
sensus on the decoherence of macroscopic quantum systems [4]. At this point,
it was pointed out that environment induced decoherence will rapidly destroy
the macroscopic coherent states in the brain [4, 5, 6, 7]. Further, Tegmark [1]
calculated the decoherence rates of the superposition of ion states and found
that these states decohere quickly.
The calculation of Tegmark undoubtedly indicates that neural networks can-
not work as quantum computers, or computers taking advantage of coherent
states. Does it mean that the brain can be modeled as a neural network obey-
ing classical physics? Here, ‘classical’ means what we observe. This question
is still open. It is because research of decoherence cannot define the position
of Heisenberg cut, or the observed system whose state vectors seem to collapse
by the observation process [4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] though the research has made
great progress not only in theoretical aspect [5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] but also in
experimental aspect [18]. Hence, decoherence has not defined what classical
system is. Nevertheless the following fact has been often missed; decoherence
is not the sufficient condition for making quantum system what we observe or
classical system, but it is merely the necessary condition.
If that decoherence occurs in the brain does not mean that the brain can be
modeled as a neural network obeying classical physics, it must be possible to
suggest brand new perspectives in research of neural networks from quantum
theoretical aspect. This is the purpose of the present work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we critically
review the work of Tegmark and consider its meaning. In section 3, we see the
solution of the question, what defines the position of Heisenberg cut. In section
4, we consider the information processing of the brain. In section 5, we discuss
the implications of our results.
2 DECOHERENCE IN THE BRAIN
A quantum superposition of resting and firing states of a neuron involves of the
order of a million ions being in a spatial superposition of inside and outside the
axon membrane, separated by a distance of the order of h ∼ 10nm. Tegmark
computed the timescale on which decoherence destroys the spatial superposition
states of the ions. The result is about 10−20s.
The above result undoubtedly indicates neural networks cannot work as
quantum computers, or computers taking advantage of coherent states, but it
is still an open question whether the brain can be modeled as a neural network
obeying classical physics. The reason is decoherence is not the sufficient condi-
tion for making quantum system what we observe, or classical system, but it is
merely the necessary condition.
There is no universally accepted definition of the borderline between a quan-
tum system and a classical system [19]. In fact, research of decoherence could
not have defined the position of Heisenberg cut, or the observed system whose
state vectors seem to collapse by the observation process. This problem has been
noticed by practitioners of decoherence [4, 8, 9, 10, 12]. This means that the
relation between what we observe and quantum theory has not been elucidated
yet. Nevertheless this fact has been often missed.
For example, imagine the box which contains gas molecules at 1 atm pressure
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with a temprature of 300K. In this example, we do not think of delocalized
coherent states of each gas molecule exists due to decoherence, but whether
each molecule in the box is classical still remains an open question. In other
words, whether state vectors of each molecule collapse (or establishes Everett
branch) is still an open question.
Further, the number of ions involved in the firing state of a neuron cannot
be rigorously a million, these must be fluctuated. For example, states of the
number of ions involved in firing might be the superposition of a million ions
and a million plus one ions states. By the way of calculation of Tegmark, we can
calculate the decoherence time of the superposition of the states of the number
of ions. This time is about 10−14s. Does this fact mean that the above two
states, the state of a million ions involved in firing and the state of a million plus
one ions involved in firing, establish different classical worlds? This question is
still open.
The above argument indicates that although we have learned decoherence
in the brain, it does not necessarily mean that the brain can be modeled as a
neural network obeying classical physics. The work of Tegmark has given us
only the necessary condition that neural networks are classical. Whether neural
networks are classical depends on whether they meat the sufficient condition.
In next section, we investigate the sufficient condition for making quantum
system what we observe, or classical system. This investigation is based on the
universality of Schrodinger equation as Everett did [20]. This assumption seems
to be reasonable in today’s situation that we could have made macroscopic
coherent states in laboratory [21, 22].
3 RELATIVE STATE FORMULATION
The formulation of observation of quantum theory is the following:
A physical system is described by a state vector | ψ〉,which is an element of
a Hilbert space. There are two fundamentally different ways in which the state
vector can change.
Process 1: The discontinuous change brought about by the observation of a
quantity with eigenstates | φ1〉,| φ2〉,. . . ,in which the state | ψ〉 will be
changed to the eigenstate | φi〉 with probability | 〈φi | ψ〉 |2 .
Process 2: The continuous, deterministic change of state of an isolated system
,which is described by a state vector | ψ〉 ,with time according to the
following equation: i∂|ψ〉
∂t
= H | ψ〉
However, Everett [20] suggested that there is only the change described by
Process 2 in the physical world, and that we do not need Process 1 when we
describe an observation process. Further, he insisted that an observed system
after observation exists merely as the state relative to an observer(relative state).
That is, if the observer described by the state | O〉 observes one of eigenstates
[| s〉] of state | ψ〉, after the interaction described by the following equation, the
state of the observer who observed certain eigenstate | s〉 is described by | Os〉.
Further, in this observer’s world, there is only the relative state | s〉.
| ψ〉 | O〉 = [
∑
s
cs | s〉] | O〉 →
∑
s
cs | s〉 | Os〉 (1)
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In Everett’s paper, we do not find the comment “the splitting of the world”
[6, 23, 24, 25]. It is an observer that splits. That is, in the case of the above
equation (1), the state of an observer | O〉 splits into each observer’s state
| Oi〉,| Oj〉, . . . . In other words, the splitting described by the following equation
(2) never happens. Here, | Rs〉 is the rest of the world state, which doesn’t
contain the state of the observer | Os〉 and the state of the observed system | s〉.
∑
s
cs | s〉 | Os〉 | Rs〉 (2)
There are some problems, however. Now we explain this by an model that
position states of a system are observed; here both the observer and the system
are assumed to be stable. Further, the observer is assumed to be described
by a macroscopic localized state | Ψ〉, and the position states of the system are
assumed to be described by a superposition of macroscopic localized states | ψ−〉
and | ψ+〉, which are spatially separated from each other. As the observation
process, for simplicity, the observer is assumed to effectively interact with the
position states of the system through photons. To be more precise, photons
effectively interact with the position states of the system, and then the photons
effectively interact with the observer.
Here we define effective interaction between matter and photons. The con-
dition of effective interaction is the following; Here, | χ〉 is the initial state of
the photons and S is scattering matrix of the matter and the photons.
| 〈χ | S | χ〉 |2∼ 0 (3)
At a first step, let us consider that the observer effectively interacts with the
position state | ψ−〉. This condition is the following:
| 〈χ | Ss | χ〉 |2∼ 0 (4)
| 〈χ(iT †s ) | So | (−iTs)χ〉 |2∼ 0 (5)
Ss ≡ 1− iTs (6)
In the above, the wavelength of photons λ is much shorter than the system.
| So〉 is the scattering matrix of the observer and the photons. | Ss〉 is the
scattering matrix whose inputs are momentum state of the photons and each
λ2cm2 of surface area state of the system.
The following could describe the interaction process. Here observer’s state
| Ψ−〉 correlates with the position state | ψ−〉.
| ψ−〉 | Ψ〉 →| ψ−〉 | Ψ−〉 (7)
Similarly, the following could describe the process which the observer ef-
fectively interacts with the position state | ψ+〉. Here observer’s state | Ψ+〉
correlates with the position state | ψ+〉.
| ψ+〉 | Ψ〉 →| ψ+〉 | Ψ+〉 (8)
From the above two processes, we can guess the process that the observer
effectively interacts with the superposition of position states of the system.
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Roughly speaking, it could be expressed by adding the above two equations(7,
8). ( Here, we neglect the interaction between state | ψ−〉 and state | ψ+〉
through photons.)
(| ψ−〉+ | ψ+〉) | Ψ〉 →| ψ−〉 | Ψ−〉+ | ψ+〉 | Ψ+〉 (9)
In the above equation, position states of the system | ψ−〉 and | ψ+〉 are
defined as states relative to the observer’s state | Ψ−〉 and | Ψ+〉, respectively
provided that the observer’s states are mutually orthogonal. However this is
not the whole story. We can expand the state of the system (| ψ−〉+ | ψ+〉) as
follows.
| ψ−〉+ | ψ+〉 = | A+〉− | A−〉√
2
+
| A+〉+ | A−〉√
2
(10)
Where | A+〉 and | A−〉 are different eigenstates of the system. In this case,
the above equation(9) could be described by the following.
| ψ−〉 | Ψ−〉+ | ψ+〉 | Ψ+〉 (11)
=
| A+〉− | A−〉√
2
| Ψ−〉+ | A+〉+ | A−〉√
2
| Ψ+〉 (12)
=| A−〉| ψ+〉− | ψ−〉√
2
+ | A+〉 | ψ+〉+ | ψ−〉√
2
(13)
In the above equation, states of the system are defined as states relative to
the observer’s states |ψ+〉−|ψ−〉√
2
,
|ψ+〉+|ψ−〉√
2
. Therefore, it is not clear what state
is observed. This is, what is called, preferred basis problem [11, 13, 25, 26, 27].
The above discussion, however, misses decoherence of the system. Macro-
scopic superposition of different spatially localized states decohere by coupling
with its environment [15, 16]. Hence the expansion (13) is impossible. Let us
assume that the environment is gas molecules. In this case, the interaction
process is thought to be similar to the process of the equation (9) even though
the composite system of the observer, the system, and the photons is not an
isolated system. It is because the interaction between the photons and the gas
is negligible. Hence the interaction between the observer and the system is the
following.
(| ψ−〉 | Ξ−〉+ | ψ+〉 | Ξ+〉) | Ψ〉 (14)
→| ψ−〉 | Ξ−〉 | Ψ−〉+ | ψ+〉 | Ξ+〉 | Ψ+〉 (15)
〈Ξ− | Ξ+〉 ∼ 0 (16)
| Ξ−〉 and | Ξ+〉 are states of the environment of the system. Before the
interaction, states of the environment | Ξ−〉 and | Ξ+〉 correlate with the posi-
tion states of the system | ψ−〉 and | ψ+〉, respectively. After the interaction,
states of the observed system are well defined as states relative to the observer’s
states provided that the states of the observer are mutually orthogonal. It is
5
because the interaction between the observer and each microscopic states of the
gas molecules which caused the decoherence is not effective, in other words, the
observer selectively interacts with position states of the system. After the in-
teraction, the observer cannot expand the composite system of the system and
its environment in different way any more.
Hence, when an observer effectively interacts with certain states of a system
whose superposition was decohered by coupling with its environment, the ob-
server splits into states each of which is relative to one of the decohered states
of the system.
The above is not the only condition that the observer splits. If the observer
A effectively interacted with a certain state of the system B, the observer A
splits when the state of the system B splits. In the following, | ΨA〉 and | ΨB〉
are the state of the observer A and the state of the system B respectively. | Ψ+B〉
and | Ψ−B〉 are the state of the observer A and the state of the system B after
splitting. c1 and c2 are normalization factors of | Ψ+B〉 and | Ψ−B〉
| ΨA〉 | ΨB〉 → c1 | ΨA〉 | Ψ+B〉+ c2 | ΨA〉 | Ψ−B〉 (17)
From this point of view, we conclude the following;
Condition of Split; (a)An observer splits into relative states to certain states
of an system when the observer selectively interacts with the certain states
whose superposition was decohered by coupling with its environment.
(b)An observer splits into states relative to certain states of an system
whose state effectively interacted with the observer when the system splits
into the certain states.
In the above Condition of Split, the observer is any matter. In other words,
we can regard any matter as the observer. It is because Condition of Split does
not necessarily reflect observation process, but it is universally useful to define
the relative states to the system.
Hence even if the split is caused by the above condition (a), this is not neces-
sarily the phenomena which is followed by an observation. In an observation, an
observer splits into distinguishablly different states each of which corresponds
to one of decohered states of an observed system. For example, in the above
equation (15), | Ψ−〉 and | Ψ+〉 are distinguishable each other, or mutually or-
thogonal. If this condition is not meant, the states of the system relative to the
observer’s states cannot be defined as mutually distinguishable states, and to
the observer, different states of the system still coexist.
Let us assume the observer is human being in the above model. In this
case, the skin of the observer effectively interacts with the gas molecules and
the observer feel the pressure of the gas. The skin also could effectively interact
with the position states of the system through a part of the gas molecules.
Hence the state of the skin could split into relative states to the position states
of the system. However these relative states are not mutually distinguishable,
hence the position states of the system relative to the skin cannot be defined
as mutually distinguishable states. One the other hand, the above interaction
through the photons, the states of the retina of the observer splits into relative
states to the position states of the system, and these relative states are mutually
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orthogonal. Hence, the position states of the system relative to the retina can
be defined as mutually distinguishable states.
The following is the definition of observation in which certain state vectors
of an observed system seems to collapse.
Condition of Observation; observation in which certain state vectors of an
observed system seem to collapse is selective interaction between an ob-
server and the certain states which are cut from states of the environment
of the system and is the interaction by which the state of the observer
splits into states which are mutually orthogonal and each of which corre-
lates with each of the certain state vectors.
Here, in an observation, the orthogonality of the states of the environment
of an observer is not necessary. Because of the success of explaining preferred
basis problem by environment induced decoherence, the orthogonarity of the
states of the environment of an observer or the brain has been often assumed
[1, 4, 25]. In the above equation (15), however, the states of the system are well
defined as relative states to the observer, and the states of the observer are well
defined as relative states to the system without the condition of orthogonality
of the state of the observer’s environment.
Using the above definition of observation, we can define the position of
Heisenberg cut, or the observed system whose state vectors seem to collapse
by the observation process. The observed system is the quantum system each
of whose decohered states is relative to each of mutually orthogonal states of an
observer. This is Copernian change in research of decoherence. Here we never
need to define, a prior, an observed system and its environment. An observed
system and its environment are defined by the interaction with an observer. In
the above case, except for the position states of the system, there are no states
which effectively interact with the observer and which correlates with each of
the mutually orthogonal states of the observer.
One problem still remains; how can we define observed systems and an ob-
server in the brain? We cannot use an external observer to define observed
systems in the brain because the brain not only processes the information but
also interprets the pattern of the activity [28]. Next section, we consider this
problem.
4 DYNAMICS IN THE BRAIN
According to paradigm of today’s brain science, a perception depends on the
simultaneous, cooperative activity of neurons [29, 30]. Hence we cannot regard
certain object in the brain as an observer in the brain, but dynamics of the
brain must compose an observer in the brain. This is an important point. As
long as we use an external observer, we can define a classical system in the brain
easily. A classical system is the system whose states is relative to an external
observer. Without an external observer, however, we cannot define an observed
system and its environment in the brain, and hence we cannot define a classical
system.
In the following, firstly, we think about the process of signal transmission
in the brain. To do so, we think about electrical synaptic transmission and
chemical synaptic transmission because there are two types of neuron in the
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brain, which take advantage of these transmissions [31]. Then, we consider the
information processing of the brain.
In the following argument, at least a part of neurons in the brain is assumed
to fire quantum probabilistically.
electrical synaptic transmission
Although it was considered, a priori, that electrical synaptic transmission would
not be present in mammalian forms, it has been found to play an important role
in the information processing of the brain [32, 33]. In this transmission, cur-
rent flows directly from one neuron to another through connexons, intercellular
channels that cluster to form gap junctions [31].
Now let us think the following example; presynaptic neuron A fires quantum
probabilistically, and the neuron A is electrically connected to postsynaptic
neuron B. Further, for simplicity, the neuron B fires by the electrical signal
from the neuron A.
In the above case, when the neuron A fires quantum probabilistically, the su-
perposition of ion states involved in the superposition of firing state and resting
state of the neuron A decohere because of the result of Tegmark. Then, through
electrical synaptic transmission, the neuron B splits into 2 states because of the
above Condition of Observation 1. These 2 states are the states; the state which
correlates with the ions involved in firing state of the neuron A and the state
which correlates with the ions involved in resting state of the neuron A. Hence
the superposition states of the neuron B are generated, one of which is firing
state of the neuron B and the other of which is resting state of the neuron B.
Then the superposition of ion states involved in the superposition of firing state
and resting state of the neuron B decohere quickly.
Firing state of the neuron A and the neuron B, however, goes back to resting
state quickly. According to the paradigm of today’s brain science, a neural
network takes advantage of synaptic efficacy to memorize an event, and it needs
repetitive activity to produce long term synaptic efficacy [31]. This indicates
that a neural network cannot keep memory of one firing event for a long time.
Hence after firing state of a neuron goes back to resting state, whether it fired
might not influence on function of a neural network.
However there is a possibility that whether it fired could influence on function
of a neural network. This is the case that the membrane of a neuron which
experienced firing and that of the neuron which did not experience firing are
separable because the separability means a signal path is divided into 2. This
separability is meant if a neuron itself or its membrane can keep the memory
of the firing event after it goes back to resting state. Now we consider this
possibility. Let us think about the following process.
| neuronresting〉 | E〉 (18)
→| neuronfiring〉 | Ef 〉+ | neuronresting〉 | Er〉 (19)
→| neuronresting2〉 | Er2〉+ | neuronresting〉 | Er〉 (20)
1Strictly speaking, there is a possibility that the neuron B splits into relative states to
different number of ions involved in firing of the neuron A. However these relative states are
not mutually distinguishable.
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where | neuronfiring〉 and | neuronresting〉 are neuron’s (or its membrane’s)
state in firing and neuron’s (or its membrane’s)state in resting, respectively.
Further, | neuronresting2〉 is the neuron’s state in resting which has experienced
firing, or neuron’s state which the neuron’s state in firing goes back to. | E〉,
| Ef 〉, | Er〉, and | Ef2〉 are the states of the environment of a neuron, each of
which is composed of states of inter neural space and outer neural space. Here,
neuron’s state in firing is any macroscopic state of neuron’s membrane when it
fires, and the state contains many different microscopic states of each atom, such
as position, energy, spin. Similarly, neuron’s state in resting is any macroscopic
state of neuron’s membrane when it is resting, and the state contains many
different microscopic states of each atom, such as position, energy, spin.
Here, if the condition 〈neuronresting2 | neuronresting〉 ∼ 1 is meant, the
membrane of a neuron which experienced firing and that of the neuron which
did not experience firing are not separable. 2. This is a reasonable condition
because of the stability of a neuron;
A neuron strongly interacts with its environment constantly and neuron’s
state in resting and neuron’s state in firing are composed of many microscopic
states. Hence the microscopic states continue to change by the interaction with
its environment. The content of the environment is mainly water molecules be-
cause concentration of ion is much less than 10−3 [34]. Further, the entrances
of ion channels, which mediate the flow of ions, cover only about 10−4 of the
membrane area [35]. Here, the difference between the state of the environment
involved in firing and the state of the environment involved in resting can be
regarded as the difference of ion states because the state of the water molecules
which strongly interact with a neuron is hardly changed by firing. The micro-
scopic change of neuron’s state by the interaction with ions is negligibly small
compared to its constant change by the interaction with water molecules. Hence,
the difference between neuron’s interaction with the ions involved in firing and
resting is absorbed into the fluctuation of neuron’s microscopic states by the
interaction with water molecules.
Hence, after going back to resting, the membrane of a neuron which expe-
rienced firing and that of the neuron which did not experience firing are not
separable. This means that after firing state of a neuron goes back to resting
state, the neuron has single signal path because the neuron’s state in resting
cannot be divided into 2 states, one of which experienced firing and the other of
which did not experience firing. Hence after firing state of a neuron goes back
to resting state, whether the neuron fired is almost irrelevant to function of a
neural network.
As we mentioned, a perception depends on the simultaneous, cooperative
activity of neurons. Further, majority of neuroscientists believe the detailed
pattern of spikes is largely irrelevant [2, 36]. Therefore, decohered superposition
of ion states involved in firing state and resting state coexist in the brain or in a
same perception. Nevertheless an external observer observe one of the 2 states
in measurement of spike in the brain because the measurement meets Condition
of Observation.
2Strictly speaking, the above expressions (18), (19), (20) are not correct. The above
neuron’s states are never pure states because they are macroscopic and their microscopic
states strongly correlate with their environment. However, we adapt the above expression for
simplicity. Further, 〈neuronresting2 | neuronresting〉 ∼ 1 means the sum of inner product of
each pure state.
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chemical synaptic transmission
In this transmission, depolarization of the presynaptic nerve terminal triggers
the release of chemical transmitters, which interact with receptors on the post-
synaptic neuron, causing excitation or inhibition [31]. The release process takes
advantage of exocytosis; vesicles packed chemical transmitters dock in synapse
and some of vesicles release chemical transmitters. Although the detail of re-
cycling of vesicles is still debated [37, 38, 39, 40], there is the possibility that
the state of the vesicle which has experienced exocytosis and the state of the
vesicle which has not experienced exocytosis are delocalized by disconnected
from synapse. In this case, the 2 states of the vesicle quickly decohere because
a vesicle is a macroscopic object.
Now let us think the following example; presynaptic neuron A fires quan-
tum probabilistically, and the neuron A is connected to postsynaptic neuron B.
Further, for simplicity, the neuron A release chemical transmitters when it fires,
and the neuron B fires by receiving chemical transmitters from the neuron A.
After the neuron B fires, by Condition of splits (a) or (b), the neuron A and
the neuron B permanently split into 2 states, one is the state which is relative
to the state of the vesicle which has experienced exocytosis and the other is
the state which is relative to the state of the vesicle which has not experienced
exocytosis. However, it does not necessarily mean the brain splits into the 2
states, or 2 different perceptions happen.
As we mentioned, firing state of a neuron goes back to resting state quickly,
and a neural network takes advantage of synaptic efficacy to memorize an event.
In other words, memory is not composed of the coordinate of vesicles, but it
is composed of synaptic efficacy. Further, as we mentioned, after going back
to resting, the membrane of a neuron which experienced firing and that of the
neuron which did not experience firing are not separable. Hence after firing
state of a neuron goes back to resting state, whether the neuron fired is almost
irrelevant to function of a neural network.
Now is the time that we confirm the meaning of relative state. As we men-
tioned, the neuron A and the neuron B permanently split into 2 states, but these
2 states are not mutually orthogonal. Hence, delocalized states of the vesicle
relative to the neuron A or neuron B cannot be defined as mutually distinguish-
able states. The split defines merely relative states to the vesicle. However
this relative relation is irrelevant to signal transmission. Signal transmission de-
pends on whether a neural network memorizes firing events. It also depends on
whether the above 2 states of the membrane of a neuron are separable because
if they are separable, two different paths of signals are generated.
From the above argument, we conclude that the states of the delocalized
vesicle coexists in the brain or in a same perception. Nevertheless an external
observer observe localized state of the vesicle because the observation meets
Condition of Observation 3.
3This does not mean that we can observe the superposition of delocalized vesicle if the
delocalized states of the vesicle do not decohere. It is because states of the delocalized vesicle
interact with different positions of retina through photons, and the states of the different
positions of retina decohere quickly. This situation is the same as that of experiment of
a diffraction grating. In this experiment, states of photons which interact with different
positions of retina decohere quickly.
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information processing of the brain
In the above, we have seen that firing state and resting state coexist in the
brain. This leads to the hypothesis; the brain takes advantage of decohered
superposition of ion states involved in firing and resting. At first glance, this
hypothesis seems to deny 2 main doctrines on the neural code by which infor-
mation is transferred through the cortex; statistical average of spike code and
precise spike time code.
The above hypothesis, however, could reconcile the fact that the 2 main
doctrines are consistent with experiments [2, 41, 42]. Even though the brain
takes advantage of the decohered superposition, each state of the superposition
is followed by quantum probability, and this probability is related with the ob-
servation of statistic quantity of spikes. Hence, the experimental results which
are consistent with the doctrine of the statistical average could be consistent
with the hypothesis, too. Further, since the brain takes advantage of the deco-
hered superposition states, it can take advantage of timing of firing. Hence, the
experimental results which are consistent with the doctrine of the precise spike
time code could be consistent with the hypothesis, too.
Here, it must be emphasized that the phenomena which compose brain activ-
ity are different from phenomena in the brain which are observed by an external
observer.
The argument, an external observer should be avoided, has been argued
in the classical context, too [30]. According to Edelman, differences between
activity patterns in the brain should be assessed only with reference to the
system itself. To do so, he suggested to divide the system in two and to consider
how one part of the system affects the rest of the system, and vice versa.
The above suggestion is useful in quantum context, too. Although the brain
takes advantage of decohered superposition states, the probability of firing must
depend on synaptic connection, and synaptic connection reflects one neuron’s
dependency on another. Hence, to analyze the brain dynamics from inside of the
brain, we need the tools which estimate one system’s dependency on another,
such as mutual information [30, 43].
5 DISCUSSION
So far, we have not considered whether the final output of the brain is only one.
This is an open question. There is a possibility that the final output is not only
one. If exclusive states of cooperative activities of neurons produce different
perceptions, the brain or a perception may split. In addition, if exclusive states
of cooperative activities of neurons cause to produce different long term mem-
ories, the brain or a perception may split. This could be useful for explaining
the free will.
In the above, we have seen that the phenomena which compose brain activity
are different from phenomena in the brain which are observed by an external
observer. It is important for not only brain science but also foundation of
physics. Apart from well devised experiment [44], it has been insisted that
different ‘interpretation of quantum theory’ cannot be distinguished because
of decoherence [16, 17]. This is the reason why majority of physicists do not
regard observation problem of quantum theory as science. The brain activity,
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however, is composed of the phenomena which have not been observed in outside
world. Hence, foundation of physics has no more been the subject of philosophy
of science. It is subject of both brain science and physics though it is still a
difficult problem to find experimental proof of the existence of the phenomena.
In the above argument, we assumed the following two. Firstly, we assumed
that at least a part of neurons in the brain fire quantum probabilistically.
There is no proof of this assumption though there are some theoretical ten-
tativeness [45, 46, 47]. Secondly, we assumed the conditions 〈neuronresting2 |
neuronresting〉 ∼ 1 without rigorous quantitative estimation. There is a possi-
bility that these assumptions are falsified. Even if the assumptions are falsified,
however, this does not necessarily mean that firing state and resting state com-
pose different perceptions, but there is a possibility that firing state and resting
state coexists in a same perception. Anyway, there is little doubt that the
following fact is crucially important for brain research; the phenomena which
compose brain activity are different from phenomena in the brain which are
observed by an external observer.
Further, even if the above hypothesis is falsified, the hypothesis suggests
the possibility of a brand new computer, which is different from both classical
computers and quantum computers, which take advantage of coherent states.
This new computer takes advantage of decohered superposition.
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